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CORPS' TEXAS COOPER LAKE AND
CHANNELS PROJECT HALTED

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: The United States Army Corps of Engi-

neers' final environmental impact statement on proposed multipurpose water project in Texas which ignores comments made on
draft statement, fails to comply with mitigation requirements of the

Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, discusses an inadequate range of
project alternatives and misstates the costs and benefits of the
project held to violate the National Environmental Policy Act. Texas
Committee on Natural Resources v. Alexander, 12 E.R.C. 1676
(D.E.D. Tex. 1978).
The South Sulphur River, with its headwaters in northeastern
Texas, flows eastward along its course of forty-five miles, draining
some five hundred square miles of primarily agricultural and ranch
land in Hunt, Hopkins, and Delta counties. At the east end of Delta
county, the South Culphur meets the North Sulphur to form Sulphur
River, which continues eastward into Arkansas. Near the Arkansas/
Texas border, Sulphur River is dammed to form Wright Patman
Lake.
By amendment to the Flood Control Act of 1954, Congress in
1955 authorized the Cooper Lake and Channels Project (Project)
which proposed a flood control, water supply and increased land
utilization system for the South Sulphur drainage area by means of
river channelization and an earthfill dam.' Between 1955 and 1967,
the Project underwent several pre-construction expansions and modifications.' In 1971, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) began construction on the Project.
In May of 1971, plaintiffs, the Texas Committee on Natural Resources, sought an injunction in the United States District Court for
1. Flood Control Act of 1954, as amended by Pub. L. No. 84-218, approved September
3, 1955.
2. H.R. Doc. No. 1056, 84th Cong. and S. Doc. No. 1027, 84th Cong. added 10,000
acre-feet of water supply to the lake. In 1959, water supply was expanded to 75,400
acre-feet pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 390(b) (1958). Further expansions under this statute were
made in 1965. In 1958, the damsite was changed and the conservation storage capacity of
the lake was increased by 9200 acre-feet in compliance with the project document. In 1967,
recreation was added as a project purpose pursuant to Pub. L. No. 87-874 and water quality
control was added as a project purpose pursuant to Pub. L. No. 87-88 §2. In December
1967, water quality control was deleted as a project purpose.
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the Eastern District of Texas to stop construction on the Project.
Plaintiffs alleged that the Corps had not prepared and submitted an
environmental impact statement (EIS) as required by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).3 At a hearing, the court
agreed with plaintiffs and preliminarily enjoined the Corps from
proceeding with construction until it completed an EIS on the
Project. In 1976, the Corps submitted a draft EIS upon which a
public hearing was held. 4 Pursuant to NEPA regulation,' the Corps
filed its final EIS with the President's Council on Environmental
Quality in June of 1977.
In Texas Committee on NaturalResources v. Alexander, plaintiffs
sought to permanently enjoin construction of the Project by challenging the sufficiency of this final EIS on six grounds: 1) the absence of state agency comments and its failure to address those
comments that were made; 2) its failure to set out adequate and
concurrent mitigation measures for losses to fish and wildlife; 3) its
failure to discuss the alternative of a water supply project independent of flood control provisions; 4) its inadequate explanation of
non-structural flood control management; 5) its bias in the presented
cost-benefit ratios and its failure to analyze the ratios presented; and
6) its lack of discussion on the impact of converting Wright Patman
Lake water to the Project.
In examining the first allegation, the court found that the Corps
had received some state agency comments from a designated Texas
clearinghouse, but had not solicited all concerned agencies directly
for comment. The court noted that the Corps' own regulations6
provide for two sources of state comment: the state agencies and
designated state clearinghouses. The court held that the use of the
conjunctive word "and" in the regulation indicated that the Corps
should have exhausted both sources. The Corps' failure to do so was
not in compliance with its own regulations or the intent of NEPA. 7
In construing the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act 8 with respect to the second allegation, the court relied on Akers v. Resor 9 in
holding that project and mitigation efforts must proceed concur3. 42 U.S.C. § §4331-4361 (1976).
4. The hearing was held July 31, 1976 in Commerce, Texas.
5. 42 U.S.C. § §4332(2)(c) (1976).
6. 33 C.F.R. §209.410(k)(4) (1978).
7. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(c) (1976) states that the Federal official "shall consult with and
obtain ... the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State and local agencies
which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards. .
8. 16 U.S.C. § § 661, 662(b) (1976).
9. 339 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Tenn. 1975).
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rently from funding through completion.' 0 The court further stated
that coordination between the agency of construction and the Fish
and Wildlife Service should be continuous and should keep abreast of
evolving methodology. Thus, the court found the Corps' claim that
the Fish and Wildlife Service is bound by its initial mitigation reports
of 1966 to be without merit. Failure to practice continuous coordination with the Fish and Wildlife Service was held to be in violation
of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.
In the area of alternatives to the Project, plaintiffs claimed that
the Corps had only considered project alternatives separately and
without reference to each other. Plaintiffs claimed that the Corps
failed to integrate the alternatives, taking the most suitable points of
each to create a set of more feasible alternatives. In particular, plaintiffs pointed to the lack of discussion on non-structural alternatives
such as zoning, flood insurance, warning systems and public education. Agreeing with plaintiffs' claim, the court noted that the Corps
had managed to integrate its alternative structural plans into various
combinations, but had failed to do the same with the non-structural
alternatives. The court also found that several statements in the EIS
concerning non-structural tools were misleading,' ' and another
statement concerning flood plain zoning to be contrary to Texas
law.' 2 For these reasons, the court held the Corps' discussion of
alternatives to the Project to be insufficient.
In considering the cost-benefit ratios contained in the EIS, the
court noted that the Corps' regulations require both cost-benefit
ratios and analyses.' ' In examining the EIS, the court found that the
analysis of the presented cost-benefit ratios was either inadequate or
entirely absent. Since the Corps had failed to present integrated nonstructural alternatives, those ratios and analyses were obviously
absent. Regarding those ratios presented, plaintiffs claimed that the
Corps had double-counted the recreation benefits of the Project.
10. The court in Akers stated that "a construction agency such as the Corps must consult
in good faith with the ecology agencies and ... it would obviously be almost fruitless not to
provide funding for the project and for whatever mitigation is to be funded at the same time
so that work could proceed concurrently." 339 F. Supp. at 1380.
11. The court said "[T] he description of flood plain acquisition implies that it is inferior
to a structural flood control program because the former does not prevent flooding... however, prevention of flooding is not the goal of this non-structural tool; rather, the goal is to
accommodate floods." 12 E.R.C. at 1684.
12. The court said "[T] he EIS incorrectly states that Texas counties lack authority to
zone unincorporated land, and that zoning regulation would disrupt the existing agricultural
and economic base of the area. But the undisputed evidence shows that agricultural use is an
established exception from flood plain zoning." 12 E.R.C. at 1684.
13. 33 C.F.R. §209.410(i)(7) (1978).
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Plaintiffs claimed that water-oriented recreation would simply shift
to Cooper Lake from other reservoirs upon completion of the
project. Since construction of these other reservoirs had been justified in part by recreational benefits, claiming these benefits again for
Cooper Lake amounted to a double counting of a surplus commodity. For these reasons, the court found the cost-benefit discussion contained in the EIS to be deficient and in violation of applicable regulations.
In considering the final allegation, the court examined the imminence of the conversion of Wright Patman Lake water to the
Cooper Lake Project. It found that while reallocation of 120,000
acre-feet of water from Wright Patman Lake to the Project had been
authorized by Congress, actual transfer of the water was not mandated by that authorization or by contracts negotiated between
Cooper Lake and Wright Patman Lake. Citing Kleppe v. Sierra
Club,'" the court held that intent or contemplation of the water
transfer was not sufficient to require an impact statement.-1
However, the court noted that when the conversion becomes imminent and an EIS is prepared, the statement must contain a discussion of the cumulative impacts of the Cooper Lake and Channels
Project. I 6

In its summary, the court reviewed other Fifth Circuit opinions
dealing with the adequacy of environmental impact statements and
stated that its role was "to determine whether the EIS was compiled
with objective good faith and whether the resulting statement would
permit a decisionmaker to fully consider and balance the environmental factors."' '7 In light of the numerous deficiencies it found in
the Corps' EIS, the court ruled that the impact statement did not
meet this standard. Consequently, the Corps was permanently enjoined from continuing the Cooper Lake and Channels Project until
it corrects the deficiencies of the EIS.
Texas Committee on Natural Resources v. Alexander is a wellreasoned opinion which clearly sets forth Fifth Circuit judicial
standards of compliance with respect to NEPA. It appears from the
facts of the case that the Corps, in wake of the preliminary injunction which issued against it, was only paying lip service to NEPA in
preparing the EIS. The holding of this case makes it clear that lip
14. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
15. The court in Kleppe said "[Tihe mere contemplation of a certain action is not
sufficient to require an impact statement." 427 U.S. at 404.
16. 12 E.R.C. at 1688.
17. Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975) at 819, as quoted in Texas
Committee on Natural Resources v. Alexander, 12 E.R.C. at 1688-1689.
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service will not do in the Fifth Circuit, and that the test of objective
good faith will be carefully applied to the facts in determining the
adequacy of an environmental impact statement.
STEPHEN K. BOWMAN

